SOCIAL REALITY
Ontological assumptions of Shared Life
Soja (2010) explains that all theory is founded on ontological assumptions about the nature of being, or the dialectical relationship between human existence and the environment in which it is embedded. He further suggests that these ontological assumptions about the nature of being are logically asserted as axiomatic. The fact that these assumptions are rarely empirically tested is of little consequence—as such, as long as it is believed to be so by enough people for a long enough length of time, it may as well be so. Soja points to the proposition that all humans are social beings as an example of a self-evident ontological assumption. He further asserts as a qualification to this proposition that although human existence is impacted and so defined by social interaction, the inherent qualities of sociality are better understood as “particularized contingencies that arise from the fundamentally social nature of our existence” rather than ontological assumptions. Instead, these particularized contingencies are acted upon by ontological assumptions, and so constitute what Soja refers to as the DNA of human thought processes.
Organized religion provides an excellent example of this DNA of human thought. Whether or not a god exists is functionally immaterial to organized religion. Certainly, one might have faith that a god does exist. However, faith does not mean that one knows for certain that a god exists; faith means that one believes that a god exists, absent empirical evidence. Each world religion exists as a series of traditional rites that reify this faith. Organized religion does not cease to function for lack of empirical evidence. In fact, organized religion does not even cease to function when empirical evidence fails to support the beliefs that are reified by religious practice. In point of fact, even if it was empirically proven that a god did not exist, it would not be the end of organized religion. This is because the particularized contingencies or, in this case, the traditional rites of any given world religion, are predicated on the ontological assumption or faith/belief that a god does indeed exist rather than empirical evidence. Therefore, if enough adherents of any given world religion believe that there is a god, there may as well be one. One might argue that a human’s conception of reality and actual reality are non-overlapping magisteria.
Interaction with the material vis-à-vis the Shared Life
Soja’s work brings to mind the way in which our perceptions overlay a priori truths. For instance, reality, as humans understand it, is dependent on several ecological, cognitive considerations—all of which except space is intrinsically rooted in axiomatic truths. Space is one of the only components of reality that is self-evident—that is, it does not require humans to experience it in order for it to have meaning. Humans overlay empirical reality with these logically asserted, but unverified, conceptions about reality. These axioms constitute reality for an individual. But if there is more than one individual, how does that change the above relationship?
As I see it, if there are two people, person (A) and person (B) looking at an object (1), then (A)’s conception of (1) is most assuredly going to be different from (B)’s understanding of (1). So what is reality then: (A)’s understanding, (B)’s understanding, or (1)’s existence? Ecological cognition suggests that collective dialogical communion between both (A) and (B) about (1) constitutes reality insofar as humans can ever be concerned.
I get the sense, that the negotiation of reality or the Shared Life is complicated exponentially by the addition of more points of view. This idea, of course, is no secret as it is the root of all conflicts between that which is culturally dominant and that which is culturally subordinate—the haves and the have-nots—men of consequence and the lay public.
SYSTEMIC CHANGE
Change Typology
Bennis, Benne, and Chin (1985) outline three major types of change strategies: 1) Empirical-Rational; 2) Normative-Re-educative; 3) Power-Coercive. These strategies exemplify planned change. That is, these strategies are appropriate for those individuals who are interested in being change agents. Each of these strategies incorporates one ontological assumption about human nature or another.
Empirical-Rational strategies of change operate within the scope of two basic assumptions about human nature. It is assumed that humans are rational, and “that men will follow their rational self-interest once this is revealed to them.” The mechanism of change in this strategy is the rational self-interest of humans. A proposed change is accepted and enacted if it is in keeping with the self-interest of the individual, group, or professional community.
Normative-Re-educative strategies rely on the assumption that human interaction is predicated on socio-cultural norms and personal value systems. It would be appropriate to think of these norms and value systems as being much the same as the “particularized contingencies” of Soja’s conception of human nature. The particularized contingencies are understood to be normative orientations that embody personal or group commitments. The Normative-Re-educative strategy of planned change suggests that change will be successful if an individual or group’s commitment to pre-existing normative orientations is re-channeled towards a new orientation. This involves restructuring an individual or group’s axiological relationship with reality. It is not unlike Jack Mezirow’s theory of transformative adult learning.
Power-Coercive models of change do not actually rely on ontological assumptions per se. The Power-Coercive strategies are deceptively straightforward. They rely on the “compliance of those with less power to the plans, direction, and leadership of those with greater power.” In the calculus of planned change, power is rather a nebulous quantity. Knowledge, numbers, strength, are all means, but authority seems to be the end. However, this authority is quite elusive. It would seem that the abovementioned means of accumulating power are all disqualified by a proper allocation of public spectacle.
Interaction with the material vis-à-vis planned change
It is easy to presuppose that one should choose one mode of operation in a deontological flurry of lifelong dogmatic struggle. In fact, I found myself doing so as I read Bennis, Benne, and Chin’s work. However, I think that it would be most efficacious if one were to moderate their behavior in view of the necessities of the situation. Certainly there are times when it is ill-advised to appeal to the rational self-interest of one’s colleagues. In point of fact, I am tempted to suggest that there is no such thing as rational self-interest; there is only a misguided and overblown feeding instinct. Take, for example, a hypothetical failing university, thoroughly lacking in academic renown. In order to remedy the situation, it would be rationally advisable to ramp up admissions requirements and streamline university employment to offset the drop in enrollment that the new admissions requirements would engender. Presumably, the augmented intellectual capacity of the student body would allow professors to appeal more directly to the academic facilities of their students. This would, ostensibly, lead to the production of graduates that would go on to positions of consequence—and all with the university’s stamp on the bottoms of their feet. That would be an Empirical-Rational strategy. It is obviously utopian.
More likely, the climate of this hypothetical university would, on the surface, be much more attributable to Normative-Re-educative models of planned change. The numerous advertising billboards that would dot the highways and the online ads that would pepper the Inboxes of thousands upon thousands of personal Email addresses, would attest to the new exciting normative orientations being formulated within the walls of this university. The university would attract people based on the promised ability to improve the lives of its students. “We will substantively change you; and you will be better for it!” would be the maxim of this new advertising campaign. Of course, this too would be nonsense. A Power-Coercive model would actually be at work. Students would apply to various programs with slack admissions standards. Each student would pay tens of thousands of dollars for acceptance to what would essentially be a degree mill, and the university would then make millions of dollars which would allow them to invest in larger marketing campaigns. With its newly earned capital, the university would essentially be able to buy renown and thereby manipulate social reality. It would, as far as anyone cared, be an excellent university. A university’s authority is not in the academic renown of its professors or its ability to positively and substantively change the lives of its students; its authority is derived from the income that its programs generate. This is an important lesson. Power is not something that is direct. Power is not inextricably tied to anything. Authority is derived from an individual or a group’s ability to manipulate a system by any means at present disposal. It is safe to assume that this would be directly applicable to developing a capacity to manipulate social reality.
It is important to understand that a social attitude is predicated on the idea that reality is axiomatic and socially constructed. The smallest unit of the social construction of axiomatic reality is the interpersonal manipulation of one’s peers. This manipulation can be achieved through a judicious application of planned change strategies. For instance, one might make a bid for authority by appealing to their peers’ rational self-interest or seek to fundamentally change how their peers interact with empirical reality by changing the mechanism from which their particularized contingencies are generated. In either case, you need not encumber your appeal with empirical veracity because reality, insofar as humans may ever reasonably be concerned, is axiological. That is, if enough of your peers believe your appeal, it may as well be true. It may seem that I am being facetious, but I assure you that the only thing that is fatuous about what I am saying is how outlandish reality seems when it is handled with a casual attitude.
References
Bennis, W.G., Benne, K.D., & Chin, R. (1985). The planning of change. Holt, Rinehart, and Winston
Soja, E.W. (2010). Seeking spatial justice. Minneapolis, MN: The University of Minnesota Press
Social Justice in Education 