FRIENDS AND NEIGHBORS (and how to change them)

SOCIAL REALITY

Ontological assumptions of Shared Life

Soja (2010) explains that all theory is founded on ontological assumptions about the nature of being, or the dialectical relationship between human existence and the environment in which it is embedded. He further suggests that these ontological assumptions about the nature of being are logically asserted as axiomatic. The fact that these assumptions are rarely empirically tested is of little consequence—as such, as long as it is believed to be so by enough people for a long enough length of time, it may as well be so. Soja points to the proposition that all humans are social beings as an example of a self-evident ontological assumption. He further asserts as a qualification to this proposition that although human existence is impacted and so defined by social interaction, the inherent qualities of sociality are better understood as “particularized contingencies that arise from the fundamentally social nature of our existence” rather than ontological assumptions. Instead, these particularized contingencies are acted upon by ontological assumptions, and so constitute what Soja refers to as the DNA of human thought processes.

Organized religion provides an excellent example of this DNA of human thought. Whether or not a god exists is functionally immaterial to organized religion. Certainly, one might have faith that a god does exist. However, faith does not mean that one knows for certain that a god exists; faith means that one believes that a god exists, absent empirical evidence. Each world religion exists as a series of traditional rites that reify this faith. Organized religion does not cease to function for lack of empirical evidence. In fact, organized religion does not even cease to function when empirical evidence fails to support the beliefs that are reified by religious practice. In point of fact, even if it was empirically proven that a god did not exist, it would not be the end of organized religion. This is because the particularized contingencies or, in this case, the traditional rites of any given world religion, are predicated on the ontological assumption or faith/belief that a god does indeed exist rather than empirical evidence. Therefore, if enough adherents of any given world religion believe that there is a god, there may as well be one. One might argue that a human’s conception of reality and actual reality are non-overlapping magisteria.

Interaction with the material vis-à-vis the Shared Life

Soja’s work brings to mind the way in which our perceptions overlay a priori truths. For instance, reality, as humans understand it, is dependent on several ecological, cognitive considerations—all of which except space is intrinsically rooted in axiomatic truths. Space is one of the only components of reality that is self-evident—that is, it does not require humans to experience it in order for it to have meaning. Humans overlay empirical reality with these logically asserted, but unverified, conceptions about reality. These axioms constitute reality for an individual. But if there is more than one individual, how does that change the above relationship?

As I see it, if there are two people, person (A) and person (B) looking at an object (1), then (A)’s conception of (1) is most assuredly going to be different from (B)’s understanding of (1). So what is reality then: (A)’s understanding, (B)’s understanding, or (1)’s existence? Ecological cognition suggests that collective dialogical communion between both (A) and (B) about (1) constitutes reality insofar as humans can ever be concerned.

I get the sense, that the negotiation of reality or the Shared Life is complicated exponentially by the addition of more points of view. This idea, of course, is no secret as it is the root of all conflicts between that which is culturally dominant and that which is culturally subordinate—the haves and the have-nots—men of consequence and the lay public.

SYSTEMIC CHANGE

Change Typology

Bennis, Benne, and Chin (1985) outline three major types of change strategies: 1) Empirical-Rational; 2) Normative-Re-educative; 3) Power-Coercive. These strategies exemplify planned change. That is, these strategies are appropriate for those individuals who are interested in being change agents. Each of these strategies incorporates one ontological assumption about human nature or another.

Empirical-Rational strategies of change operate within the scope of two basic assumptions about human nature. It is assumed that humans are rational, and “that men will follow their rational self-interest once this is revealed to them.” The mechanism of change in this strategy is the rational self-interest of humans. A proposed change is accepted and enacted if it is in keeping with the self-interest of the individual, group, or professional community.

Normative-Re-educative strategies rely on the assumption that human interaction is predicated on socio-cultural norms and personal value systems. It would be appropriate to think of these norms and value systems as being much the same as the “particularized contingencies” of Soja’s conception of human nature. The particularized contingencies are understood to be normative orientations that embody personal or group commitments. The Normative-Re-educative strategy of planned change suggests that change will be successful if an individual or group’s commitment to pre-existing normative orientations is re-channeled towards a new orientation. This involves restructuring an individual or group’s axiological relationship with reality. It is not unlike Jack Mezirow’s theory of transformative adult learning.

Power-Coercive models of change do not actually rely on ontological assumptions per se. The Power-Coercive strategies are deceptively straightforward. They rely on the “compliance of those with less power to the plans, direction, and leadership of those with greater power.” In the calculus of planned change, power is rather a nebulous quantity. Knowledge, numbers, strength, are all means, but authority seems to be the end. However, this authority is quite elusive. It would seem that the abovementioned means of accumulating power are all disqualified by a proper allocation of public spectacle.

Interaction with the material vis-à-vis planned change

It is easy to presuppose that one should choose one mode of operation in a deontological flurry of lifelong dogmatic struggle. In fact, I found myself doing so as I read Bennis, Benne, and Chin’s work. However, I think that it would be most efficacious if one were to moderate their behavior in view of the necessities of the situation. Certainly there are times when it is ill-advised to appeal to the rational self-interest of one’s colleagues. In point of fact, I am tempted to suggest that there is no such thing as rational self-interest; there is only a misguided and overblown feeding instinct. Take, for example, a hypothetical failing university, thoroughly lacking in academic renown. In order to remedy the situation, it would be rationally advisable to ramp up admissions requirements and streamline university employment to offset the drop in enrollment that the new admissions requirements would engender. Presumably, the augmented intellectual capacity of the student body would allow professors to appeal more directly to the academic facilities of their students. This would, ostensibly, lead to the production of graduates that would go on to positions of consequence—and all with the university’s stamp on the bottoms of their feet. That would be an Empirical-Rational strategy. It is obviously utopian.

More likely, the climate of this hypothetical university would, on the surface, be much more attributable to Normative-Re-educative models of planned change. The numerous advertising billboards that would dot the highways and the online ads that would pepper the Inboxes of thousands upon thousands of personal Email addresses, would attest to the new exciting normative orientations being formulated within the walls of this university. The university would attract people based on the promised ability to improve the lives of its students. “We will substantively change you; and you will be better for it!” would be the maxim of this new advertising campaign. Of course, this too would be nonsense. A Power-Coercive model would actually be at work. Students would apply to various programs with slack admissions standards. Each student would pay tens of thousands of dollars for acceptance to what would essentially be a degree mill, and the university would then make millions of dollars which would allow them to invest in larger marketing campaigns. With its newly earned capital, the university would essentially be able to buy renown and thereby manipulate social reality. It would, as far as anyone cared, be an excellent university. A university’s authority is not in the academic renown of its professors or its ability to positively and substantively change the lives of its students; its authority is derived from the income that its programs generate. This is an important lesson. Power is not something that is direct. Power is not inextricably tied to anything. Authority is derived from an individual or a group’s ability to manipulate a system by any means at present disposal.  It is safe to assume that this would be directly applicable to developing a capacity to manipulate social reality.

It is important to understand that a social attitude is predicated on the idea that reality is axiomatic and socially constructed. The smallest unit of the social construction of axiomatic reality is the interpersonal manipulation of one’s peers. This manipulation can be achieved through a judicious application of planned change strategies. For instance, one might make a bid for authority by appealing to their peers’ rational self-interest or seek to fundamentally change how their peers interact with empirical reality by changing the mechanism from which their particularized contingencies are generated. In either case, you need not encumber your appeal with empirical veracity because reality, insofar as humans may ever reasonably be concerned, is axiological. That is, if enough of your peers believe your appeal, it may as well be true. It may seem that I am being facetious, but I assure you that the only thing that is fatuous about what I am saying is how outlandish reality seems when it is handled with a casual attitude.

References

Bennis, W.G., Benne, K.D., & Chin, R. (1985). The planning of change. Holt, Rinehart, and Winston

Soja, E.W. (2010). Seeking spatial justice. Minneapolis, MN: The University of Minnesota Press

Personal Reflection: The Human Paradigm

DISCLAIMER

This essay will be confined to the theoretical aspects of paradigmatic change with regard to human nature as I currently understand it and its possible benefits to the addressing cultural proficiency. My understanding of human nature is informed by Integral Paradigm Theory, and as such draws from John Locke’s tabula rasa and association of ideas, Donald Hebb’s theory of synaptic plasticity (Hebb’s Postulate), the second law of thermodynamics (particularly with regard to entropy and heat death in a closed system), and the Jungian concept of the Collective Unconscious.

KUHN’S CONTRIBUTION TO MY UNDERSTANDING OF PARADIGMATIC THEORY

                Through reading Kuhn’s essay concerning normal science, I have come to understand paradigms as a bounded field of mutually agreed upon fundamentals. These fundamentals are predicated on and reified by scientific achievements that are novel enough to garner attention yet fluid enough to invite further study. The life’s blood of a paradigm is the quality and quantity of its adherents as well as the constant maintenance of the status quo within the paradigm by its adherents. Much of the work done within normal science is the reification of the paradigm through “the articulation of those phenomena and theories that the paradigm already supplies” (Kuhn, p. 24). It would be easy to reduce the definition of paradigmatic theory to a cliché metaphor about boxes, however, I personally, prefer an equally pedestrian cliché that is slightly more adept at capturing the mechanisms of paradigms within normal science: a lens. The image of a box, I argue, does not adequately address the work of a paradigm because it brings to mind a completely static, closed system. However, if one were to view a paradigm as a lens, I believe, he or she would be closer to the mechanisms of a paradigm because the fundamentals of a paradigm may be viewed as directional methodologies that may be focused on any phenomenon. In this, I depart from Kuhn’s view of paradigms. It seems to me that scientific communities do not necessarily create new paradigms that necessitate new theories and methodologies to accompany them when they have exhausted the fuel of the original paradigm. I would argue, rather, that it is more reasonable to suggest that scientific communities tend to exam new phenomena with the familiar paradigmatic features more readily than creating a new paradigm to address the said phenomena. I will agree that such a departure is merely academic as the result of viewing paradigms as a lens rather than a box merely yields a similar outcome via a different means. Viewing the a bounded frontier of the natural world with a bounded set of methodologies and theories would yield the same results as viewing the unbounded frontier of the natural world with a bounded set methodologies and theories; it would simply become an issue of when the scientific community exhausts itself. This seems to closely approximate what is happening within the field of Education. It seems to me that a substantial portion of current Educational theory is a restatement of Dr. John Dewey’s work concerning experiential education. In other words, I feel that the paradigmatic nature of educational theory has fostered a culture of reinventing the wheel, and, as a result, educational theory has made very little progress since the early 1900s. This is not to say that the politics of educational policy has not also played a hand in the development of the said culture.

INTEGRAL PARADIGM

                Integral Paradigm or Integral Theory, as a method of both defining and addressing the abovementioned issues of the current system of normal science, draws from a very wide base of very eclectic modes of thinking. As one may glean from the title, Integral Paradigm’s mechanism relies on a very inductive process of thinking. Rather than view the natural world from a bounded paradigm, Integral Paradigm seeks to view the natural world from several paradigms. In so doing, Integral Paradigm is an effectively unbounded method of inquiry. I feel that this method of inquiry can define and address the often myopic scope of normal science as well as provide a framework with which to address the cultural proficiency issues within any work environment.

DEFINING THE ISSUE USING INTEGRAL PARADIGM

                Tabula rasa: In order to begin to define the issues of normal science and the apparent difficulties associated with becoming culturally proficient, I will first draw from John Locke’s theory of tabula rasa, in which he views the developing mind as a blank slate on which new ideas are inscribed. Utilizing this theory with regard to cultural stereotypes, let us say for example, that on a given blank slate, empirical evidence inscribes (A) Hispanic individual, (B) Hispanic culture is collectivist and high context, (C) current educational practice is based on individualistic and low-context pedagogy, and (D) there tends to be an achievement gap between Hispanic students and White students. Currently, on this hypothetical blank slate, there are three more or less unrelated ideas. However, through association of ideas, these previously unrelated ideas begin to move towards a causal relationship. The movement from (A) to (B) to (C) to (D) are further linked through this process of association.

Hebb’s Postulate: Further explanation of this process of thought association relies on Donald Hebb’s theory concerning synaptic plasticity. Hebb posits that neurons become associated through repeated and consistent associative excitation. In other words, if the axon terminal of neuron (A) binds itself through neurotransmitter to the dendrites of neuron (B), thusly creating a chemical synapse, and continues to excite neuron (B), both neuron (A) and neuron (B) will begin to associate more vigorously by developing more axon terminals and more dendrites, respectively, and in so doing, create more synapses. This is perhaps, one of the more foundational views of reflexive thinking and can be viewed as support of Schema Theory.

Hebb’s Postulate in association with Tabula Rasa: In revisiting the abovementioned example of cultural stereotypes with the added concept of Hebbian Theory, a more complete understanding of paradigmatic myopia and cultural incapacity begins to take form. Continuing from the above example, if through repeated neural association, that is, through repeated association of ideas, it becomes possible to wear a deep and long-standing path between (A) Hispanic individual, (B) Hispanic culture is collectivist and high context, (C) current educational practice is based on individualistic and low-context pedagogy, and (D) there tends to be an achievement gap between Hispanic students and White students. After repeated association between these points or ideas, through Hebbian principle, the association becomes reflexive. It therefore, for the sake of the example, becomes possible to reflexively associate a Hispanic individual with collectivist or high context cultural tendencies, or with chronic under-achievement. One may see how this may be problematic both for becoming culturally proficient and for scientific inquiry.

Second Law of Thermodynamics: In essence, the second law of thermodynamics states that, given enough time, in a closed system heat death will occur through entropy. A very basic way to describe this would be to fill a tuperware container with two types of cereal and then seal the container. As a sealed container, the tuperware and the cereal become a closed system. Given enough time, the two types of cereal in the container would breakdown sufficiently in order that it may be reckoned as one type of cereal. This is the process of molecular entropy in a closed system. In a closed system, given enough time, energy on a molecular level reaches what is known as heat death. This mechanism can be applied to the aforementioned example concerning tabula rasa and Hebb’s postulate. For example, if the blank slate and ideas (A) through (D) are considered a closed system and association of ideas is considered the principal force of locomotion and chief agent of entropy, one may rightly assume that when a person ceases to learn new ideas, a type of heat death of the mind ensues. In this regard, failing to learn more about a culture or a person leads to a reification of often faulty assumptions that are based on bounded paradigmatic associations. In other words, stereotypes are fueled by mental heat death. The same may be said of normal science.

THE HUMAN PARADIGM

                The abovementioned three theories come from what are reckoned as three very different paradigms. Tabula Rasa comes from Epistemology; Hebb’s postulate comes from Neuropsychology; and Thermodynamics comes from Chemistry and Physics. However, through integral paradigm, it would seem that there is substantial blurring of the boundaries between the three paradigms. I would suggest that this blurring of paradigmatic boundaries speaks to the veracity of the Jungian concept of the collective unconscious. Each and every paradigm was articulated through the intellectual work the human mind. It, therefore, should not be shocking that each paradigm should bear substantial residual evidence of human thought processes. For example, the behavior of a dog is less than shocking to a human. In fact, a rather sizable and lucrative industry has developed around the manipulation of canine behavior. It should then come as no surprise that from an objective and slightly broader vantage, the miraculous and ever-expanding psyche of the human may very well seem less than miraculous and not at all ever-expanding. As disappointing as that may sound, it would be even more disappointing if by maintaining the paradigmatic nature of normal science, we further handicapped our ability to stave off mental heat death a little while longer. To this end, I believe that utilizing a more expansive theory concerning paradigms, one such as Integral Paradigm, more may be achieved. By opening the system of the mind to new ideas, it may be possible to attain a measure of cultural proficiency and dynamic inquiry.

References

Kuhn, T. (1996). The structure of scientific revolutions. Chicago, IL: The University of Chicago Press.